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ABSTRACT 
The present paper aims to contribute to the debate on what kind of governance and 
institutions are needed to ensure stability and growth in the Eurozone. In fact, despite the 
economic recovery, the Eurozone does not yet have effective institutions to ensure stability 
in the face of a new economic crisis, without forgetting legitimacy, transparency, and ability 
to meet the expectations of greater prosperity for euro area citizens. This paper intends to 
support the view of a deep rethinking of EMU with a different governance and different 
institutions. The new governance should imply a renewed political agreement among the 
member states not only of the Eurozone, but also of the whole European Union. This political 
agreement must lead to a reconsideration of the Maastricht parameters, to a different 
approach of the European institutions and, lastly, to the change of the EU Treaty. The paper 
will also discuss the role of institutions that must balance the European interests and those 
of member states with the aim to provide a consistent approach to stability and growth.  
Keywords: European Commission; ECB; rules-based system; economic convergence; 
banking union; financial stability; growth-oriented policies; transparency; legitimacy; treaty 
changes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial fragility has been the main cause of the difficult times in the world economy, and 
particularly in the Eurozone, from 2008 on. In fact, the Eurozone has suffered most since 
the global financial crisis in terms of growth and unemployment. Besides the global financial 
crisis of 2008, member states of European Monetary Union (EMU) also experienced a 
sovereign debt crisis from 2010, causing great instability at national level among member 
states. The crisis has definitely shown that the institutional architecture of EMU had many 
flaws. Today, EMU is stronger than in the past but it is still not able to guarantee stability 
and growth even in the most difficult times, as recognized by the European Commission 
itself in its recent Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(2017b). Actually, the economic conditions in the countries of Eurozone have improved in 
the last years, thanks to ad hoc crisis management measures, several governance changes 
and attempts to implement longer-term reforms, but the Eurozone does not have a 
governance and institutions which are satisfactory in terms of economic convergence 
between Eurozone members. Also, Eurozone does not yet have effective institutions to 
ensure the stability in the face of a new economic crisis, without forgetting transparency, 
legitimacy and ability to meet the expectations of greater prosperity for euro area citizens. 
Thus, open questions remain such as: which kind of governance is the more suitable for the 
Eurozone? How can stability in the Eurozone be achieved and maintained over time, without 
any negative effects on growth? How can the European institutions sustain their legitimacy 
and be accountable?  
A sustainable currency union requires an effective governance that guarantees stability and 
security, coordination of economic policies growth-oriented, transparent and legitimate 
institutions. Today, the European Commission and, more generally, the European 
institutions seem more aware of what a sustainable currency union needs, but the problem 
is how to translate this awareness into operative and effective decisions, and appropriate 
policies. 
This paper contributes to the debate on which kind of governance and institutions are 
required to ensure stability and growth in the Eurozone. It supports a deep rethinking of EMU 
with a change to governance and institutions. The new governance should imply a renewed 
political agreement among the Eurozone member states, but also within the EU. This 
political agreement must lead to a reconsideration of the Maastricht parameters, a different 
approach by the European institutions, and a change of the EU Treaty. The paper will also 
discuss the institutions’ roles in balancing European and member states’ interests to provide 
a consistent approach to stability and growth.  
Next, the paper provides an overview of the EMU governance. Then, it examines open 
issues in the governance and reviews which kinds of governance are needed for survival of 
the Eurozone. The paper ends with a conclusion section. 
 
2. THE GOVERNANCE OF EMU  
 
The EMU has been an incomplete system since its origin, because it is a monetary union 
without fiscal union (Eichengreen & von Hagen, 1996) or, at least, some degree of 
centralization of the budgetary policy of the several member states (MacDougall Report, 
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1977). Furthermore, Eurozone falls short of the requirements for an optimal currency area. 
In fact, it lacked the fiscal capacity and labor mobility advocated by optimum currency area 
theory (Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1993). In addition, its member states have not conveyed 
sufficiently.  
EMU has a single currency, but it is without a state (Padoa Schioppa, 2004). There is a 
basic contradiction between a single supranational currency and the continuation of the 
nation-state based economic policies. This contradiction has been a key factor of the euro 
crisis.  Since the EMU’s inception, there has not been consensus neither political will on the 
correct balance of additional integration necessary to the appropriate functioning of the 
system. A challenge to this balance relies in the structural differences between the 
economies of the member states, which resulted in labour costs, productivity, and inflation 
divergences, that brought about divergences in price- and cost-competitiveness.  
Another major challenge lies in balancing the trade-off between independence in the area 
of fiscal and financial policy and coordination within a monetary union, since, when the 
Eurozone crisis began in 2010, the EMU governance system has been found devoid of 
market-sharing mechanisms and fiscal stabilization mechanisms (Alcidi & Gros, 2015).    
The EMU governance1 is built on a rules-based system with sanctions for non-compliance. 
But many member countries have shown unwillingness or inability to implement rules 
properly, namely those who advocated the strict compliance with such rules like Germany 
and France. In fact, the rules applied to budgetary policies were not applied in full or 
consistently by member states since 1999. A recent study of IMF (Eyraud, Poghosya & 
Gaspar, 2017) confirms that EU countries have been running excessive deficits and 
distorted budgets, applying a poor compliance with financial rules in the single currency 
area.  Because of the crisis, the European authorities and the member states agreed to 
reform the governance of the EMU. Thus, the introduction of the European Semester 
(November 2010), as the main pillar of the new governance framework, put emphasis on 
economic policy coordination and macroeconomic surveillance in the EU, without changing 
the principle of the rules-based approach. Apart from the European Semester, other 
measures aimed to enhance integration and stability were then adopted. It follows that 
sovereign debt resolution mechanism and bailing out facilities within the Eurozone became 
operational, such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in June 2010 and the 
European Stability Mechanism in October 2012. Also, in December 2011 the “Six-Pack”2 
and in May 2013 the “Two-Pack” legislation, which include rules designed to deal with 
shocks and policy coordination, were implemented. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the EMU, the so called Fiscal Compact3, in force since January 2013, 
aimed to reinforce the financial stability of the Eurozone through a stricter coordination of 
the national budget policies, including the definition of benchmarks for structural deficit and 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and a judicial enforcement mechanism for noncompliance with such 
                                                          
1 But also, the EU governance. 
2 The “Six-Pack” is a set of legislative decisions to enhance economic governance. It introduced the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, a surveillance procedure, identifying ten indicators and indicative 
thresholds (Sanchis i Marco, 2014). 
3  The core of the new treaty and its real novelty lies in the introduction of the ‘golden rule’: the obligation to 
introduce into national law (preferably constitutional) the new budgetary limits defined in Article 3, para. 1, in 
particular a ‘structural’ deficit not exceeding 0.5% of the GDP. (De Witte, 2012).  
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benchmarks. These stability-based rules should produce convergence toward export-
oriented growth and competitiveness, as long as member states follow them. An important 
step has been the introduction of Banking Union, which aims at building an integrated 
financial framework to safeguard financial stability and minimize the cost of bank failures. 
Thus, in 2013 and 2014 the two elements of Banking Union, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), were agreed, involving the 
supervision and resolution of banks from national at Eurozone level and giving to the ECB 
the surveillance role, in order to overcome the “doom loop” determined by the sovereign 
debt crisis. What is still missing to complete the Banking Union is the establishment of a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). Véron (2015) underlines that a European 
Deposit Insurance with a credible backstop constitutes an essential element of the Banking 
Union. It has not occurred yet, mainly because of the concerns of some country (e.g. 
Germany), who is afraid to become perennial net contributor to such a deposit guarantee4. 
The other missing element in the governance framework of the banking union is the fiscal 
backstop, since crises affecting banks are commonly macro-economic and general in 
nature. Thus, some centralized fiscal backstop at European level to finance deposit 
insurance and bank resolution is needed to give the fund credibility (Obstfeld, 2013; 
Schoenmaker, 2015). However, this focus on finance indicates a shift in favor of the view 
that a single currency and financial stability are incompatible with national supervision, given 
the interdependence of sovereigns with their banks (Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Furthermore, 
always to ensure financial stability, new regulations for financial systems have been taken 
by the European Commission concerning capital requirements, hedge and equity funds, and 
some derivatives. Regarding fiscal policy, in accordance with the Five President’s Report in 
Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (June 2015), on 25 October 2015 the 
Commission established the European Fiscal Board (EFB) in the context of implementing 
an integrated framework for sound fiscal policies. This independent institution should 
coordinate the network of national fiscal councils and find an equilibrium between 
compliance with the tax rules in each country of the Eurozone and the results in terms of 
overall fiscal policy. 
Finally, ECB expanded its role implementing unconventional monetary policies, as in the 
case of Outright Market Transactions (OMT) program in summer 20125, and later in January 
2015 with the quantitative easing, so reinforcing the tendency to supranationalism. 
However, this process of governance changes has been slow and laborious, where the 
political decisions were often taken only when the situation became critical. 
But the rules-based system of the EMU suffers from a number of limitations. First, rules 
suffer from low anticipatory power. To deal with emerging risks, it is necessary to have 
significant instruments that can be employed quickly (or even automatically) rather than 
having a set of inflexible rules (Zuleeg, 2015, p.58). A second limitation, concerns how to 
pick appropriate rules/targets adapted to both the European economic environment and 
country-specific conditions. Rules and uniform policies do not fit at European level and, at 
the same time, at a national level. Furthermore, cross-country spillover effects undoubtedly 
                                                          
4 The Council, however, is continuing to work at a technical level on the Commission proposal for the 
establishment of EDIS with the aim of strengthening the banking union. 
5  OMT had spillover effects on fiscal policy (Schilirò, 2014). 
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exist, but their size and timing depend on the economic conditions; thus, too-stringent rules 
may lead to sub-optimal outcomes (Alcidi & Gros, 2015, p. 48). Another point is that the 
rules are very often asymmetrical, because, for instance, they focus on current account 
deficits and much less on surplus, which is considered a demonstration of economic 
efficiency (Gros, Busse, 2013). Consequently, the correction of the evolution of internal 
demand of surplus countries is problematic. The rules-based system is further complicated 
by the need to interpret rules, which always opens up potential disagreements, since the 
decision-making process reflects a series of compromises between EU institutions, member 
states and non-governmental interests. Indeed, the body of laws and rules, and the available 
instruments are too complex and difficult to be understood and implemented by policy-
makers. Furthermore, there is the perennial question of enforcement mechanisms (Zuleeg, 
2015)6, where the Commission is the major institutions in charge of enforcing the rules7.  
Last but not least, in its present form, the rules-based governance framework lacks a 
democratic feedback mechanism through which voters could more effectively influence the 
decision-making process in Brussels (Alcidi, Giovannini & Piedrafita, 2014).  
The goal of building a European federation, through evolution from the economic union to a 
political union, has so far failed. But the systemic problems of the Eurozone would require a 
far-reaching degree of political union necessary to sustain the monetary union in the long 
run, as several economists pointed out (e.g. Kaldor, 1978; De Grauwe, 1992). It is true that 
the treaties of the European Union and also of the Eurozone aim at more integration, in 
particular to a more federal, political, and fiscal union, but the current situation is far from 
this goal. The European Union and, even more, the Eurozone suffer the distortion 
represented by the primacy of economics over politics, and this depends on the existence 
of an economic sovereignty in the absence of a political sovereignty. Ordo-liberalism 
became dominant in the design of the euro, and that ideology is part of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Despite the European states are often equipped with a welfare system embedded in their 
constitutional laws that respond to the idea of a social market economy, and EU Treaty 
contains principles regarding a social market economy8, such institutional and political 
system has been under attack. The main reason is that it has determined troubles to public 
budgets and created problems with the financial markets9. Thus, the conflict between the 
economic sovereignty of the regulators and the policy of the member states leads to the 
emergence of a dialectic, very difficult to compose, among the reasons of stability and those 
of growth.  
 
 
                                                          
6 For instance, the macroeconomic imbalances procedure has been limited to the detection and prevention 
phases, while the number of member countries with excessive imbalances has increased in the period 2014-
2016, without the corrective phase being activated. 
7 However, there is the question about the Commission considered to be a more political body than an 
independent institution. 
8 The EU Treaty, Article 3 paragraph 3 states: “The Union… shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, …” 
9Public and private debt in Eurozone remains an important concern and an urgent priority for the European 
Commission (2017a). 
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3. OPEN ISSUES IN THE EMU GOVERNANCE 
 
The Eurozone crisis have brought about a fundamental shift in the existing EU legal and 
institutional structures. The decision-making process tends to combine highly centralized 
supranational intervention, especially monetary policy by the ECB and, to a less extent, 
budgetary policy by the Commission, with intergovernmental control of key political 
decisions10. However, the intergovernmental method has not been able to guarantee an 
effective decision-making process, nor legitimacy to the EMU. Governments have 
demanded more Europe, but not at the cost of national decision-making (Hertie School of 
Governance, 2015). It follows that the economic crisis in Europe has also determined an 
institutional crisis. This institutional crisis led member countries in a bind. On the one hand, 
they cannot go back from the integration process, on the other hand, for them it is hard to 
move on and find workable and effective solutions. In recent years, with the deepening of 
the crisis there has been a tendency towards nationalism, opposite to that favorable to the 
EU and the EMU.  
In addition, the European Council, which serves to the purpose of the intergovernmental 
approach, lacks democratic legitimacy. In fact, the ‘Community Method’, that is, the co-
decision model of policymaking has been overcome by a new intergovernmentalism, in 
which the intergovernmental actors have become more active in exercising leadership 
(Schmidt, 2016).  The big member states, in particular, are exercising the power outside the 
formal institutions11. Therefore, it is necessary to take action on the deficit of representation 
that characterize the European institutions, the mechanism for the approval of the laws, and, 
more generally, the governance. Not to mention the political and legal accountability that is 
lacking in the Eurozone economic governance. 
The issue of fiscal union, which is important also to complete the Banking Union, is an 
emblematic case. For a fiscal union, which would empower the European authorities to raise 
taxes, the statement: “no taxation without representation”, requires equal representation for 
all citizens, but this is one of the main flaw of the EU system. 
Thus, after sixty years from the signature of the founding Treaty of the European 
Community12, despite several significant successes, not only underpinning peace on the 
continent but creating a single market as well as a single currency, the EU project is facing 
serious political problems and economic difficulties. In addition, the flaws that became 
clearly evident in the euro crisis have yet to be fixed. Political, economic and legal issues 
regarding the functioning of the EMU remain open. At the same time, prolonged economic 
pain determined dissatisfaction and distrust towards the EU and its institutions, in particular, 
in the Eurozone.  Populist and anti-European parties are attacking the EU’s very existence 
in some European countries. The most dramatic result of the anti-EU movement so far is 
                                                          
10 EMU’s main actors, however, include the ECB, the Ecofin Council and the European Commission (Chang, 
2016). The Eurogroup, instead, is an informal body, set out in Protocol No 14 to the Lisbon Treaty and entered 
into force on 1 December 2009, with the aim of ensuring close coordination of economic policies among the 
Eurozone member states. 
11 The problem concerns mainly Germany, which of course remains the strongest country of the Eurozone and 
therefore its influence cannot be that significant. The question is whether its leadership does not become 
hegemony. 
12 On March 25th 1957, six European countries signed the founding Treaty of a Community that later came to 
be called European Union. 
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Brexit, wherein the main political victim is the Union. As Herman van Rompuy, former 
President of the European Council, maintains: 
“[The European Union] project is now no longer irreversible. The idea of the Founding 
Fathers was precisely to create irreversible economic bonds so that war would be 
precluded. Trade at the service of peace. Interdependence was the aim” (Van Rompuy, 
2017, p.10). 
A typical response from Brussels to such challenges has been simply to muddle through. 
This latter response has favored the status quo. Yet, muddling through has its own risks, 
because problems are never really faced and solved in a way or another, and the crisis 
remains latent. Recently, the European Commission has released a White Paper on the 
Future of Europe (2017a). This White Paper presents five scenarios regarding the potential 
state of the EU by 2025 depending on the choices that the member states and the European 
institutions will make.  The possibilities covered by the five scenarios range from the status 
quo, to a change of scope and priorities, to a partial or collective leap forward (European 
Commission, 2017a, p.15). In particular, the third scenario: ‘Those who want more and 
more’, allows the EU willing member states to do more together in specific areas. As a result, 
Eurozone member states, but also other EU countries, would agree to deepen their 
cooperation on budgetary arrangements, working closer on taxation13 and social matters.  
This latter scenario embraces the idea of a “multi-speed” Europe. This notion essentially 
means that core members, particularly the Eurozone member states, should be able to 
pursue common policies and more integration in areas like fiscal and welfare policy, to 
implement a proper banking union and a common debt instrument through sharing 
institutions, but also in the area of defence. This group of countries should accept, for 
instance, an Eurogroup Finance Minister and a Eurozone Treasury.  The other EU members 
belong to another group not ready to accept the sacrifice of sovereignty needed to join the 
euro, but only the acceptance of the Single Market. However, they are united by a common 
set of institutions such as the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament, as 
well as the interactions among member state representatives in those institutions. But since 
the Eurozone is already differentiated and strongly divided in economic policy preferences 
between Northern and Southern member countries, it is preferable rejecting the idea of more 
uniformity. Integration should focus, instead, on compatibility and towards the ‘united in 
diversity’ vision of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European Convention of 2003 (Hertie 
School of Governance, 2015). Moreover, the balance between solidarity and conditionality 
should be made more transparent, predictable and legitimate.  
Yet, the process of integration and crisis management instruments must be implemented 
through a renewed constitutional condition in order to regain legitimacy. In fact, any process 
involving the centralization of powers and resources to a greater level of integration requires 
a higher degree of political union. So, it is necessary to provide democratic legitimacy and 
accountability, since this kind of proposals imply a profound transfer of sovereignty from 
member states to European institutions. Not only, but also these reforms will require new 
institutions, and changes to the mandates of existing institutions. It follows that new actors 
                                                          
13 For instance, through greater harmonization of tax rules and rates, thus reducing compliance costs and 
limiting tax evasion. 
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(e.g. the European parliament) must be involved14. However, in order to achieve a more 
radical but necessary reform, member states should find an agreement towards a new 
treaty. Although it is an unfeasible goal to reach immediately, treaty change is ultimately the 
only realistic path to greater legitimacy and a more symmetric union. For instance, changes 
in the treaties are required for institutional issues, including the independence of the ECB, 
its role as a lender of last resort, fiscal austerity, and being a part of the EU Treaty.15  
According to Schmidt (2016), intergovernmental decision-making causes the Council suffers 
from the unanimity rule in several areas. This rule involves the treaties, which makes difficult 
to forge consensus and alter existing treaties. The unanimity rule implies that lowest-
common-denominator agreements are most likely where the issues are most challenging. 
In supranational decision making the Commission and the ECB are hemmed in by the sub-
optimal treaties and rules agreed upon by the Council. This creates insufficient flexibility or 
discretion to take the steps to effectively implement the policies. While the EU-level 
institutions have strengthened in the new governance framework, the national level 
government has weakened, which creates a conflict between the EU institutions and 
national states on fundamental issues (i.e., money, borders and security). This creates a 
problem of democracy and legitimacy. As Schmidt observes: 
 “National democracies… have increasingly become the domain of ‘politics without policy,’ 
whereas the EU level appears as ‘policy without politics’ “(Schmidt, 2016, p. 9). 
However, the European “democracy” consists of policies determined at the EU level, which 
are generally in an apolitical or technocratic manner, In the meantime, politics remains 
national. 
Any further reform of the EMU governance must consider EU-level impacts on national 
democracy. This requires new ways of thinking to decentralize and/or deconcentrate power 
and responsibility to the national level for the sake of national democracy and legitimacy 
(Schmidt, 2016). 
 
4. GOVERNANCE FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE EUROZONE  
 
The European Commission (2017b, p.16) acknowledges that:  
“The overall governance has improved but remains sub-optimal to allow the euro area to 
perform as well as it could, to be as responsive as it should be to changing economic 
circumstances and economic shocks, and to win over the mistrust of some parts of the 
population”. 
Thus, the Eurozone must simultaneously pursue growth, monetary and financial stability, 
and reforms. The previous analysis revealed that a new governance design of the Eurozone 
requires a deep rethinking of EMU and the management of the single currency. Eurozone 
does not need, however, a centralized governance characterized by restrictive rules and 
sanction-triggering numbers. In particular, constraining fiscal policy limits the one avenue 
available to countries to cushion against asymmetric shocks. Fiscal policy can do more to 
                                                          
14 Actually, in the case of Eurozone governance, the European Parliament became involved via the 
‘Community method’ when it was asked to legislate on the stability rules, including the “Six Pack” and the “Two 
Pack” (Schmidt, 2016). 
15 In particular, the ECB does not have the power to act as a lender of last resort since Article 123 TFEU 
prohibits monetary financing. 
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support internal demand of member countries (Posen et al., 2014; Schilirò, 2017). The rules 
based approach that governs the EMU has manifested its limits. Therefore, the question is 
whether this approach is the best route to coordinate the Eurozone economies. It is clear 
that strengthening the Eurozone mainly via rules is too complex and ineffective. Analysis of 
Eurozone governance suggests that its extensive and complex set of rules and procedures 
needs greater transparency and simplification. In addition, Eurozone should coordinate 
macroeconomic governance while decentralizing microeconomic governance to the benefit 
of the member states. At the same time, supranationalism is necessary to guarantee the 
overall functioning of the system and to avoid the tendency to excessive fragmentation.  
A major proposal consists of reconsidering the Maastricht parameters. Should the debt 
criterion be set to 60% of GDP without adjusting it to a value closer to the value that emerged 
after the exceptional crisis that hit the Eurozone (Schilirò, 2017)?16 Why maintaining the 
same parameter for all the Eurozone countries? Another suggestion (Schmidt, 2016) is to 
make macroeconomic governance by the ECB more flexible, by using the Maastricht criteria 
as general guidelines for variable yearly targets. This would depend upon the Eurozone’s 
employment, as well as inflation prospects. It would clearly extend the mandate of the ECB. 
Regarding the completion of banking union, the ECB should continue to become a normal 
central bank and take the lender role of last resort (Eichengreen & Wyplosz, 2016). In 
addition, ESM should directly recapitalize the banks (Schoenmaker, 2015). The deposit 
insurance function should be exercised at Eurozone level. Financial stability will be improved 
by the implication that the fiscal backstop related to these functions is no longer at the 
national level. Another important element that can contribute to overall resilience of the 
financial sector is the Capital Markets Union (CMU), as stressed by the European 
Commission’s Reflection Paper (2017b). CMU could augment economic risk sharing, set 
the right conditions for more dynamic development of risk capital for high-growth firms, and 
improve choices and returns for savers (Véron & Wolff, 2015). This significant change is 
ongoing with some difficulties due to a system of regulated services that, in turn, imply 
institutions with a different regulatory enforcement and an adequate infrastructure of system-
wide surveillance. 
Moreover, any oriented-growth policy must be founded on a program of investments. The 
"Juncker Plan" to mobilize € 630 billion of extra investment for the EU is a significant decision 
and it goes in the right direction, although more effort is needed. However, such policy must 
be also founded on strengthening the aggregate demand, not pursuing only stability, but this 
is the opposite of pro-cyclical policies based on continued austerity (De Grauwe, 2013; 
Posen et al., 2014; Schmidt, 2015; Schilirò, 2017).  
It is also important to make this a bottom-up process. This would be convenient when using 
the existing national institutional architecture of the European Semester in a more 
decentralized manner. At the same time, it keeps the coordination at the EU level. This 
would make Eurozone governance more democratically legitimate, especially if national 
parliaments were asked for consultation with the European Parliament. Structural reforms 
are very important to the effective functioning of the EMU. Given the interconnections across 
the Eurozone, macroeconomic coordination between member states and European 
                                                          
16 The suggestion of raising the level of the debt ratio does not imply that high debt countries can renounce 
fiscal discipline and sustainable public finances in the long run, but simply that the 60% criterion is not realistic. 
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institutions must be better addressed. Furthermore, the Eurogroup can play a greater role 
in the coordination of overall economic policies (national and Eurozone) as it considers 
transparent and accountable decisions.  
Establishing the European finance minister - as proposed by President Juncker - who is at 
the same time a member of the Commission and chair of the Eurogroup, and a minister 
responsible to the European Parliament and national parliaments can create confusion at 
institutional level and prove to be a weak practice. In fact, it would become a tool of national 
governments within the Commission and not vice-versa. How can this minister be 
accountable to the 19 national parliaments? How can these parliaments sanction choices 
that do not share? Finally, a European finance minister should manage a European budget 
under the control of the European Parliament. Yet, this is far from a tax capacity independent 
of the financial transfers of member states. 
It may be more important to have an effective process to coordinate monetary, financial and 
structural policies in the Eurozone, as well as the institutions responsible for them. A close 
coordination between the ECB and other policy authorities is needed on macro-prudential 
policies. A coordination by the Eurogroup of overall economic policies is also needed. The 
ESM could play an important role through its budget and capacity to intervene in support of 
the member states (as in the case of exceptional natural events that, within the constraints 
of budgets, would damage a converging growth). Thu, the ESM should become the 
European Monetary Fund and the financial pillar of the EMU to help the real economy of the 
Eurozone 17. With this view, the ESM could also issue Eurobonds18. The literature and the 
proposals on the Eurobonds are numerous (e.g. Delpla & von Weizsäcker, 2010; Favero & 
Missale, 2012; Pâris, & Wyplosz, 2014; Quadrio Curzio, 2011; Tonveronachi; 2014). In fact, 
completing EMU with some forms of debt mutualization (i.e.Eurobonds) has been debated 
and interpreted as a sort of fiscal union. This fiscal union is necessary because a surviving 
monetary zone needs monetary integration coupled with a considerable degree of fiscal 
integration. The Eurozone case is a hybrid solution. It has a limited common budget and is 
without capacity for macroeconomic stabilization. Yet, it has a strong conditionality for fiscal 
discipline. In addition, a successful monetary zone needs some political union (e.g. one of 
different types of federalism) (Rodrigues, 2014). 
While it is not easily achieved, a renewed political agreement is necessary for the new EMU 
governance (Schilirò, 2017). Such political agreement must implement legislative changes 
on crucial issues. One way to overcome these hurdles is through treaties involving the 
Eurozone (e.g. the Stability and Growth Pact or the Fiscal Compact). They should become 
ordinary legislation amendable by simple majority through the “Community Method” 
(Schmidt, 2015). This would imply that such legislation would be open to amendment 
through political debate and compromise. 
In addition, EU institutions require greater legitimacy, which means that they must be more 
accountable, open, and inclusive. It also needs greater citizen participation and 
representation. National parliaments would need to be better integrated into the 
                                                          
17 Germany, through its minister, Schauble, proposes instead that the ESM becomes the EMU’s budget 
auditor, subtracting that role to the European Commission, which is considered a political body that follows a 
lax fiscal policy. 
18 Actually, ESM currently issues bonds on a small scale. 
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policymaking process, which differs from the yearly European parliament-national 
parliament meetings established in the Lisbon Treaty. The European Commission (2017b) 
seems aware of this debated issue. It proposed arrangements with the European institutions 
and bodies involved in decisions on matters related to the Eurozone. However, more direct 
citizen access to European institutions is necessary to counter technocratic beliefs in the 
benefits of top-down hierarchy. This would make the governance more effective and 
legitimate. The recent proposal of direct election by the citizens of the president of the 
European Council is a step in this direction.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper is critical analysis of the current governance of EMU. This contribution aimed to 
highlight the governance and institution needed for the stability and growth of the Eurozone. 
The Eurozone has undergone fundamental changes due to the crisis. Although many 
European citizens have become sceptic about the benefits of the single currency, member 
states remain highly dependent on each other, and the sharing of common interests should 
take them to strengthen the EMU and its governance. Indeed, this strengthening process 
remains complex and delicate as it must balance the diverging interests of Eurozone 
member states and of their heterogeneous economies. 
Despite the Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union by the 
European Commission (2017b) indicates many elements that can contribute to complete the 
EMU, this work underlines the importance of growth-oriented policies, more than stability-
oriented and suggests others fundamental changes in the governance. A major issue that 
emerged in the present discussion regards the limitations of the rules-based system of the 
EMU. Another point is about the method of decision-making processes. In fact, 
intergovernmentalism has become the primary mode of governance in the Eurozone. The 
analysis carried out suggests that this approach to governance must be revised, since it is 
strongly influenced by the German ordo-liberalism ideology. At the same time 
supranationalism has also increased significantly. In fact, not only the role of the 
Commission has grown considerably, just think of the European Semester, but, above all, 
ECB has become the most important actor in responding to crisis moments, not to mention 
its responsibilities with regard to the banking union and the ESM. This growing 
supranationalism has been partly a necessary consequence of the missing in action by the 
governments of member states and their indecision in the policies, but also a need to 
rebalance the tendencies to fragmentation of the Eurozone.  
Another relevant issue discussed concerns the institutions, since they must be designed to 
guarantee more transparency and legitimacy, and play a new role in order to take into 
account the European interests and those of member states. For instance, the present 
contribution suggests a major role for the ESM which is currently underutilized and it can do 
more for the convergence of growth in the Eurozone. In addition, the decision-making on 
Eurozone policy should involve more the European parliament. 
Finally, the completion of the EMU is a necessary goal but it requires a rethinking of the 
entire system, which will be possible only through a revision of the treaties. This process will 
12 
 
take time and great efforts, and a new political agreement among the member states about 
what the Eurozone should look like and how to implement the reforms. This is probably the 
best way to complete the EMU and make the Eurozone more resilient to the future crises. 
 
Acknowledgments: I wish to thank Manuel Sanchis i Marco for his comments and 
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